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Compulsory Licensing of Musical Compositions for
Phonorecords Under the Copyright Act of 1976
By Paul S. Rosenlund*
In 1976, Congress revised the copyright law of the United States
for the first time in sixty-seven years.' As in 1909, when the previous
copyright law was passed, one of the more controversial subjects of the
1976 Act was compulsory licensing of musical compositions for repro-
duction in sound recordings. Basically, compulsory licensing under
both the 1909 and 1976 Acts requires a music publisher to license a
record company to manufacture and distribute phonorecords of most
copyrighted music. To obtain such a license, a record company need
only follow certain notice procedures and pay the modest mechanical
royalty specified in the compulsory licensing statute.2
The procedures which governed the availability and operation of
compulsory licenses under the 1909 Act were unnecessarily burden-
some on both copyright proprietors and the recording industry. As a
result, most licenses that were issued for recording music were not ob-
tained through the statutory scheme but were privately negotiated be-
tween the parties. 3 Negotiated licenses were similar in most respects to
compulsory licenses except that the requirements of statutory licensing
dealing with notice were deleted and accounting procedures for royal-
ties were amended.4 The omission of the statutory requirements oper-
ated entirely to the benefit of the record companies and conferred no
corresponding benefit upon the copyright proprietors. More impor-
* B.S., 1976, University of California, Davis. Member, Third Year Class. This Note
will be entered in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition.
1. The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
app. §§ 101-810 (1976)). Except as expressly provided, the 1976 Act became effective on
January 1, 1978. Pub. L. No. 94-553 § 102 (1976). The 1909 Act, repealed by the 1976 Act,
was originally enacted as the Act of March 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 349, 35 Stat. 1075 (extant
amended version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1976)). Unless otherwise stated all references to the
1909 Act are to the extant amended version.
2. 17 U.S.C. app. § 115 (1976); 1909 Act §§ 1(e), 101(e). A license obtained through
the statutory procedure is commonly called a compulsory or statutory license. The term
"mechanical license" is more general, and refers to either a compulsory license or a similar
license which is negotiated between a record company and a copyright proprietor. Royalties
payable under any type of mechanical license are referred to as "mechanical" or "publish-
ing" royalties.
3. See note 33 & accompanying text infra.
4, See notes 33-38 & accompanying text infra.
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tantly, the statutory licensing rate of two cents per song per record dis-
tributed acted in most instances as a ceiling on the rates paid under
negotiated licenses. As a practical matter, a record company could ob-
tain a negotiated license on demand but without the controls imposed
by the compulsory licenses which were more beneficial to the copyright
proprietors.5
The system that developed under the 1909 Act only accomplished
half of the original goal of compulsory licensing. The goal was to make
music readily available for the public's enjoyment while still ade-
quately compensating composers for their work.6 Under the 1909 Act,
music was freely available for recording, perhaps too freely, but be-
cause of the many changes in the structure of the recording industry
that had taken place since 1909, composers were not receiving what
they thought to be adequate compensation. 7 Against this backdrop,
Congress began the task of copyright revision. After years of hearings
and debates, a new system of compulsory licensing was enacted in 1976
which paid a slightly higher royalty, but otherwise retained the past
system, insofar as it delegated control over the licensing procedure to
the recording industry.
This Note does not dispute the need for some sort of a mandatory
licensing system, but takes the position that the 1976 amendments to
the compulsory licensing scheme continue to place overly broad restric-
tions on composers' power to control the disposition of their music.
More specifically, copyright proprietors should be allowed to command
higher licensing rates potentially available in a more open market. The
suggested solution is to increase dramatically the statutory licensing
rate, in order to effectively eliminate the artificial ceiling on royalty
rates. Copyright proprietors would continue to be required to license
their music but would be given more freedom to negotiate the rate at
which music is licensed. The royalty rate would soon reach a realistic
market level. Such a system would place authors and composers8 on a
5. See notes 39-41 & accompanying text infra.
6. See note 42 infra.
7. See notes 43-59 & accompanying text infra.
8. The terms "author," "composer," and "songwriter" are defined for the purposes of
this Note as the creator of any music copyrightable under 17 U.S.C. app. § 102 (1976).
Although the creator of a work is generally the initial copyright owner under 17 U.S.C. app.
§ 201(a) (1976), the copyright in a musical composition is usually assigned to a publisher,
which, by agreement, issues licenses and collects royalties, sharing them with the composer.
A music publisher will generally share mechanical royalties with the composer on an equal
basis. See S. SHEMEL & W. KRASILOVSKY, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC 148-61, 205, 518-25
(rev. & enlarged new Copyright Act ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as THIS Bus NEss OF Mu-
sic]. A composer may also "publish" his own music. This involves forming a publishing
company, usually a sole proprietorship or partnership, and contracting with a royalty ad-
ministration firm to issue licenses, collect royalties, and disburse them to the publishing
company (Le., the composer) after subtracting a small fee, usually 3 1/4 to 4 1/2%. Id at
[Vol. 30
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more equal footing with other creative persons whose copyrighted
works are not subject to similar restrictions.
The Nature of Exclusive Rights in Copyrighted Works
Authors have no constitutional right to control the reproduction of
their original works. The Constitution merely provides that "Congress
shall have the power. .. [tlo promote the Progress of Science and the
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 9 Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Court held in 1834 that copyrights in published'O
works were purely statutory." Rights granted by Congress are, there-
fore, subject to any limitations or qualifications which Congress sees fit
to impose in the public interest.12
Prior to the 1909 Copyright Act, composers had no right to control
mechanical reproduction 3 of their music. The Supreme Court held in
White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co. 14 that the making of a
piano roll did not constitute copying, publication, or infringement of
the copyright in a musical composition under the then current copy-
202-05, 233-35. Self-publishing has the obvious advantage of providing higher income for
the composer because there is no royalty split. A traditional music publisher can justify its
50% royalty split, however, because it will promote the music and seek artists to perform and
record the composition, generating higher royalties for the composer. Id at 148-54.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 8.
10. A work is considered to be "published" when it is distributed to the public in the
form of copies or phonorecords by sale, lease, lending or otherwise. Thus, merely printing
or recording a work in some fashion does not constitute publication unless it is distributed to
the public. "A public performance or display of a work does not of itself constitute publica-
tion." 17 U.S.C. app. § 101 (1976).
11. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). The common law did, however,
recognize a copyright in unpublished works. Id at 597-98; see note 10 supra. Common-law
copyright was abolished by § 301 of the 1976 Act. The new exclusive federal copyright in
unpublished works is essentially the same as the common-law copyright, but it ensures uni-
formity by preempting state law. See Brown, Unji/catiorn'A Cheerful Requiemfor Common
Law Copyrqght, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1070 (1977); Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, In-
voluntary Transfers and Compulsory Licenses- Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 1107 (1977).
12. Although the Constitution speaks only in terms of granting exclusive rights, the
constitutionality of granting nonexclusive rights, Ze., compulsory licensing under § l(e) of
the 1909 Act, was never seriously challenged. This occurred possibly because composers
and publishers feared that an unfavorable decision would divest composers of even the lim-
ited rights granted by § 1(e). M. NimmER, 1 NiMmER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.07 (1978) [herein-
after cited as NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT].
13. The 1909 Act used the terms "mechanical reproduction" and "parts of instruments
serving to reproduce mechanically the musical work" in the same sense that the 1976 Act
uses the term "phonorecord." Compare 1909 Act § 1(e) with 17 U.S.C. app. § 101 (1976).
See note 70 infra.
14. 209 U.S. 1 (1908); accord, Stem v. Rosey, 17 App. D.C. 562 (1901); Kennedy v.
MeTammany, 33 F. 584 (C.C.D. Mass. 1888), appeal dismissed, 145 U.S. 643 (1892).
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right statute.' 5 The Court reasoned that perforated paper piano rolls,
wax cylinders, phonograph records, and other similar mechanical de-
vices for reproducing music were not "copies" of copyrighted sheet mu-
sic because one could not perceive the actual musical notation while
looking at such a device.16 Consequently, the large piano-roll industry
and the growing phonograph industry could record any copyrighted
composition without paying royalties to the composer or publisher.
The prominent composers of the day, of course, felt that they should
own the exclusive rights to their compositions for mechanical reproduc-
tion, just as writers owned the exclusive rights to print their books.' 7
The injustice of this unequal treatment, coupled with the rapid growth
of the piano roll and phonograph industries, led to a strong push for
control over the mechanical reproduction of music. 18
Compulsory Licensing Under the 1909 Act
After several years of debate over the mechanical rights issue,
Congress granted limited control of mechanical rights to copyright pro-
prietors.' 9 The feelings in Congress at the time were that the American
public should continue to have access to the popular music of the day,
but that the growing economic importance of mechanically reproduced
music made it necessary to guarantee composers adequate compensa-
tion for their work.20 Congress' concern for the rights of composers
was tempered, however, by a fear that a "mechanical-music trust"
would develop if exclusive mechanical rights were created. 21 The polit-
ical climate of the era, moreover, necessitated that Congress adhere to
15. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 565, § 4952, 26 Stat. 1106 (repealed 1909).
16. 209 U.S. at 17-18.
17. E.g., John Philip Sousa said that "[y]ou can take any catalog of records of any
talking machine company in this country and you will find from 20 to 100 of my composi-
tions on it. I have yet to receive the first penny for the use of them. . . . They [the phono-
graph companies] pay Caruso $3,000 to make a record in their machine .... Arguments
Be/ore the Comm. on Patents of the Senate and House of Representatives on S. 6330 and H.A
19853, 59th Cong., Ist Sess. 24-25 (1906) [hereinafter cited as June 1906 Hearings].
18. June 1906 Hearings, supra note 17, at 24-25.
19. Act of March 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 349, §§ l(e), 25(e), 35 Stat. 1075, as amended, 17
U.S.C. §§ 1(e), 101(e) (1976) (repealed 1976).
20. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909).
21. It appeared that a large number of music publishers, in anticipation of a court
ruling giving them exclusive rights to mechanical reproduction, had assigned their mechani-
cal rights to the Aeolian Company, a prominent manufacturer of piano rolls. Testimony at
hearings alleged that this arrangement was intended to create a mechanical-music monopoly
in the Aeolian Company. Such a monopoly was already believed to exist in Italy. id at 7-8;
June 1906 Hearings, supra note 17, at 165-70, 202-06 (statements of Albert H. Walker, Esq.,
and Nathan Burkan, Esq.). A copy of one of these Aeolian contracts is reproduced in Hear-
ings Beore Subcomn. No. 3 f the House Comm, on the Judiciary on H.R 4347, H.. 5680,
H. 6831, H.R 6835, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 724-27 (1965) (statement of Record Industry
Ass'n of America, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as 1965 House Hearings].
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an attitude of "trust busting."22 Congress' fear was probably ground-
less,23 but was sufficient, nonetheless, to support limitations on the
mechanical rights created by the 1909 Act.24
The compulsory licensing provisions of the 1909 Copyright Act re-
mained substantially the same until 1976 when the new copyright act
was passed, despite numerous attempts to repeal them.25 Compulsory
licensing has been much maligned,26 but is generally considered the
most influential force in the development of the music publishing and
recording industries.27
Sections l(e) and 101(e) of the 1909 Act fulfilled the basic goal of
compensating composers for their efforts while preventing any one
party from monopolizing or otherwise abusing mechanical rights in
22. The Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647,26 Stat. 209 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-
7 (1976)) was passed in 1890. The Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 and 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1976)) was passed in 1914.
23. See June 1906 Hearings, supra note 17, at 202-06 (testimony of Nathan Burkan,
Esq.). But e Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. American Soe'y of Composers, Au-
thors and Publishers, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3221 (1978)
(No. 77-1583) (price fixing action successfully brought under Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1976), against performing rights society which controls exclusive public perform-
ance rights in music); Note, The Middleman as Price Fixer: Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 91 HARv. L. REV. 488 (1977);
Note, C.B.S. v. A.S.C.A.P.: Peq'brming Rights Societies and the Per Se Rule, 87 YALE L.J.
783 (1978).
24. This compulsory licensing solution to the problem was unique at the time, but
many other countries have since enacted similar laws. HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
89TH CONG., 1ST SEss., COPYRIGHr LAW REVISION, PART 6, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF
THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW:
1965 REVISION BILL 53 (Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter cited as Supp. REP. REG.].
25. A complete history of the 1909 Act and subsequent attempts to amend it is given in
H. HENN, THE COMPULSORY LICENSE PROVISIONS OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, Copy-
RIGHT OFFICE STUDY No. 5, at 1-35 (1956), reprinted in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 877
(Arthur Fisher memorial ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as HENN]. See also A. SHAFTER, MUSI-
CAL COPYRIGHT 331-33 (2d ed. 1939); Diamond, Sound Recordings and Copyright Revision,
53 IOWA L. REv. 839 (1968); Diamond, Copyright Problems of the Phonograph Record
Industry, 15 VAND. L. REv. 419 (1962); Evans, The Law of Copyright and the Right of
MechanicalReproduction fMausical Compositions, 3 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 112 (1940); Com-
ment, Compromise to a Correct Result: Retention and Modification of the Compulsory License
in Proposed Copyright Law Revision, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 1520 (1965). Section 101(e) of the
1909 Act was amended in 1971 by Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (repealed 1976). This
amendment dealt with copyright in sound recordings and did not affect compulsory licens-
ing. See notes 70 & 77 infra.
26. See, eg., HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., IST SESS., COPYRIGHT
LAW REVISION, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 33-36 (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961 REP. REG.];
HENN, supra note 25, at 82.
27. See, ag., SuPP. REP. REG., supra note 24, at 53; W. BLAISDELL, THE ECONOMIC
ASPECTS OF THE COMPULSORY LICENSE, COPYRIGHT OFFICE STUDY No. 6, at 91-96 (1958),
reprinted in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 937 (Arthur Fisher memorial ed. 1963).
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any particular composition. 28 The provisions achieved this goal by set-
ting forth very precise procedures to be followed by both the copyright
proprietor and the compulsory licensee. The Act provided that: (1) the
copyright proprietor was to file a "notice of use" of a copyrighted com-
position with the Copyright Office immediately after allowing the first
phonorecord to be made or lose all rights to collect royalties for
mechanical reproduction;29 (2) any person who wanted to use the com-
position in a phonorecord after the initial recording had to send a no-
tice of such intention to the Copyright Office and to the copyright
proprietor;30 (3) the manufacturer of the "parts" (records, tapes, piano
rolls or any similar devices) had to pay to the copyright proprietor two
cents per "part" manufactured, whether or not they were ever sold;3'
and (4) royalties were to be paid monthly, with royalty statements veri-
fied by the record manufacturer under penalty of perjury.3 2
Provisions (3) and (4), above, were considered unnecessarily bur-
densome by record manufacturers, which found that they could
streamline licensing procedures by negotiating for licenses directly with
the copyright proprietors rather than following the statutory proce-
dures. As a result, virtually all mechanical licenses obtained while the
1909 Act was in effect were negotiated rather than obtained through
the compulsory licensing procedure. 33
28. For example, the song "Moon River" received the 1962 award of the Academy of
Motion Picture Arts & Sciences. By 1963, over 100 different recorded versions of the song
had been released in the United States. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 2D
SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 4, FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON PRE-
LIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 427 (Comm. Print 1964) [hereinafter
cited as REP. REG. PART 4].
29. 1909 Act § 1(e); see note 82 & accompanying text infra.
30. 1909 Act § l(e).
31. 1909 Act § 1(e). The 1909 Act was framed in terms of a royalty of 2¢; per record
(called a "part" in the 1909 Act). This has been interpreted to mean 2¢ per song on today's
long playing records. ABC Music Corp. v. Janov, 186 F. Supp. 443, 445 (S.D. Cal. 1960); 2
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 12, § 8.04[h][1].
32. 1909 Act § l(e).
33. Julian T. Abeles, a representative of the Harry Fox Agency, which issues mechani-
cal licenses for many music publishers, stated, "I fid that not in one single instance over the
years-not one, and I defy anybody to prove to the contrary-has a legitimate record com-
pany ever served notice under the compulsory license provision of the Act. In every instance
they obtain an agreement from the publisher, because of certain benefits that are derived
therefrom irrespective of the Act." HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., IST
SEsS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 3, PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPY-
RIGHT LAW AND DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT 216 (Comm. Print 1964).
Another commentator stated that compulsory licenses have "not been used with respect
to one millionth of one per cent of the phonograph records which have been manufactured
in the United States." Seton, Music-Domestic Phonograph Records, in THE BUSINESS AND
LAW OF MUSIC 21, 24-25 (J. Taubman ed. 1965). See generally B. KAPLAN & R. BROWN,
CASES ON COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND OTHER TOPICS BEARING ON THE PRO-
TECTION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND ARTISTIC WORKS 437-41 (3d ed. R. Brown 1978).
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Negotiated licenses were generally framed in terms of the copy-
right act s but relaxed the restrictions of the statutory license in several
significant ways, all of which inured solely to the benefit of the record-
ing industry. First, royalties were payable not for all parts manufac-
tured, but only for parts actually distributed.35 Second, royalties were
payable quarterly rather than monthly.3 6 Third, royalty statements did
not have to be made under oath.37 Finally, the requirements that the
notice of intent to use be filed by the licensee were waived.38 In addi-
tion, the royalty rate payable under such negotiated licenses was not
always as high as the two cents per song statutory rate. Indeed, the
statutory rate acted in most cases as a ceiling on the royalty rates paid
under negotiated licenses.39 Undoubtedly, some very popular song-
writers could demand higher royalties, but the legislative histories of
the 1976 Act do not contain any reference to licenses having been is-
sued for more than the statutory rate.4 It was difficult for a publisher
to demand more than the statutory rate for negotiated licenses because
a record company always had the option of invoking a compulsory
license.
The recording industry readily concedes its control over the licens-
34. Examples of negotiated licenses are located in ENTERTAINMENT LAW INSTITUTE,
REcoRD AND Music PUBLISHING FoRMs OF AGREMmENT IN CURRENT USE 443-44 (I. Spie-
gel & J. Cooper eds. 1971) [hereinafter cited as ENTERTAINMENT LAW INSTITUTE FORMS];
THis BUSI.NSS OF Music, supra note 8, at 535.
35. THIS BusiNEss OF Music, supra note 8, at 535.
36. Id.; ENTERTAINMiENT LAW INSTITUTE FoRMs, supra note 34, at 443-44.
37. THIS BuSINEss OF Music, supra note 8, at 535; ENTERTAINMENT LAW INSTITUTE
FoRMs, supra note 34, at 443-44.
38. TmIs BusiNEss OF Music, supra note 8, at 535; ENTERTA NMENT LAW INSTITUTE
FoRMS, supra note 34, at 443-44.
39. A great deal of conflicting evidence on this issue exists. A music publishers' survey
reported that the average royalty rate paid is 1.620. The record companies reported, how-
ever, that 81% of all licenses are issued at the two cent rate, and that the vast majority of the
remaining licenses are issued at lower rates because they are for "budget," "club," or "pre-
mium" records which are sold at a lower retail price. S. REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 93 (1975). [hereinafter cited as 1975 SENATE REPORT]. Why copyright owners haven't
simply "held out" for higher royalties under the threat of forcing record companies into
using the cumbersome and expensive compulsory licensing procedure is unknown. A "take
it or leave it" attitude of record companies or a fear of some sort of blacklisting may have
contributed to this situation.
Some royalty rates for songs on long playing albums are actually higher than two cents.
Popular albums released in the 1960's commonly had 12 songs, each licensed at two cents for
a total of 24€, per album. The 240 figure became a guide for all albums, regardless of the
number of songs on the album. The result was that an album with only 8 songs was still
licensed for a total of 24, meaning that the longer playing songs were licensed at more than
two cents. On an album by album basis though, this practice had no net effect on royalty
rates. See Supp. REP. REG., supra note 24, at 57.
40. See 1975 SENATE REPORT, supra note 40, at 93; H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 107-11 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 HousE REPORT].
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ing process. A spokesman for the Record Industry Association of
America stated that "[elverybody in the record industry knows that he
is free to have his artists perform for recording purposes just about any
musical composition they care to sing or play. . . . [T]he general prac-
tice of the industry is to make the recording first and arrange for copy-
right clearance later."'4I
The industry's practice cannot be condemned per se. The free
availability of music for public enjoyment certainly benefits us all. The
crucial issue, however, is whether composers, the creators of this music,
are being adequately compensated for the benefits they bestow upon
society and whether there should be such an ironclad ceiling on the
royalties payable.42
Placing a limit on mechanical royalty rates created little contro-
versy in 1909. At that time and for many years thereafter, the major
source of income for composers was from the sale of copyrighted sheet
music rather than phonorecords.4 3 Consequently, compulsory licensing
did not constitute a major inroad upon the rights of composers, espe-
cially in light of the fact that composers had no mechanical rights what-
soever prior to the enactment of the 1909 Act.44
The economic situation today, however, is quite different from
that of 1909. Phonorecords are the most important medium for the
distribution of popular compositions.4 5 Sales of sheet music and folios
in the United States are less important for most songwriters than they
were in 1909.46 Consequently, mechanical royalties are one of the most
important sources of income for today's popular songwriters.47
Recording artists who write the music which they record are also
heavily dependent upon mechanical royalties. This dependency may
be especially prevalent among new recording artists who have little lev-
41. REP. REG. PART 4, supra note 28, at 425.
42. The Register of Copyrights stated in 1965, "The basic legislative problem is to in-
sure that the copyright law provides the necessary monetary incentive to write, produce,
publish, and disseminate creative works, while at the same time guarding against the danger
that these works will not be disseminated and used as fully as they should because of copy-
right restrictions." SuPP. REP. REG., supra note 24, at 13.
In enacting the 1909 Act, Congress stated that copyright is not granted "primarily for
the benefit of the author, but primarily for the benefit of the public." H.R. REP. No. 2222,
60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909).
43. See HENN, supra note 25, at 44; THIS BuSINEsS OF Music, supra note 8, at 153.
44. See notes 13-18 & accompanying text supra.
45. THIS BUSINESS OF Music, supra note 8, at xvii-xxiii.
46. Id at 153.
47. Performing rights, which are exclusive, 17 U.S.C. app. § 102 (1976), generate the
other major source of revenue for songwriters and publishers. Most performance royalties
are derived from the licensing of radio and television broadcasts of copyrighted music. See
note 23 supra; THIS BUSINESS OF Music, supra note 8, at 162.
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erage when bargaining with record companies. 48 Recording contracts
for most artists require that very large numbers of records must be sold
before a record company must pay artists' royalties to the artist.
Recording contracts generally provide that artists are to be paid
artists' royalties on the basis of a percentage of the price of every record
sold. This percentage may vary from five to fifteen percent or more of
the retail price of a record, depending on the prestige and popularity of
the artist.49 Before any artists' royalties are payable, however, record-
ing contracts usually provide that recording costs and a number of
other expenses are to be recouped by the record company out of artists'
royalties.50 With recording costs alone capable of exceeding
$100,000, 5 1 it is estimated that only one record in five has sufficient
sales to actually recoup its costs out of artist royalties. 52 The other four
records do not, however, necessarily lose money for the record compa-
nies that released them. A record company may receive sufficient reve-
nues through record sales to recover its own expenses, but unless the
accumulated artists' royalties, which are but a fraction of the price of a
record, exceed the costs that are recoupable under the recording con-
tract, the artist will normally receive no artists' royalties. 53 Further-
more, most contracts provide that recoupable costs and royalties are to
be cross-collateralized among all records made by an artist with the
company. Cross-collateralization offsets the royalties of a successful
record against the losses of a poor selling record, again leaving the art-
ist with no artists' royalties.54
The economics of the record industry and the uncertainty sur-
48. See Bergman, Records Set the Exploitation Record, ART & THE LAW 7 (Jan. Feb.
1977) [hereinafter cited as Bergman].
49. See THIs BUSINESS OF Music, supra note 8, at 2-5. Artists' royalties are paid by
record companies to compensate recording artists for their performances which are embod-
ied in the recording. Only mechanical royalties pay for the use of a copyrighted musical
composition. The payment of artists' royalties based upon a percentage of the price of
records distributed is customary, but an artist and record company are free to negotiate any
form of compensation, such as a flat fee per record recorded, depending on the relative
bargaining power of the parties.
50. A standard form contract for new artists provides that the following expenses are to
be recouped from artists' royalties: all studio costs, including salary for musicians, engineers,
arrangers, sketchers, copyists, payments to unions, packaging, expenses for LPs and tapes,
"reserves for returns, exchanges, credits, rebates and allowances of any kind," and consumer
advertising. ENTERTAn.i4ENr LAW INsTITUTE FORMS, supra note 34, at 2-4. An artist is
not, however, liable to the record company for these expenses if they are not actually
recouped. This risk falls upon the record company and is often cited as a justification for
the general nature of the recording contracts discussed above. THIS BusINEss OF MuSIC,
supra note 8, at 8-9.
51. THIS BUsINEss OF Music, supra note 8, at 9.
52. 1975 SENATE REPORT, supra note 39, at 92; see Bergman, supra note 48, at 7.
53. Bergman, supra note 48, at 7.
54. Id; Tins BUSINESS OF Music, supra note 8, at 8.
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rounding artists' royalties encourages musicians to record their own
music. Rather than depend on artists' royalties, which are highly spec-
ulative and derived purely from contract, a musician is likely to seek
mechanical royalties, which record companies are obligated to pay
under the copyright law. Thus, even a record which generates artists'
royalties insufficient to recoup costs will generate mechanical royalties
that the record company must normally pay to the copyright owners of
the music that is recorded. As a general practice, costs are not deducted
from these mechanical royalties by record companies,"5 thus assuring
income for the artist-songwriter. Recording one's own music also en-
sures that the music will be circulated, allowing for the possibility that
another recording artist will like the song and want to record it, thereby
generating more mechanical royalties for the composer.
Composers must, however, guard their publishing rights carefully.
Many record companies publish music through a subsidiary company
and try to acquire an assignment of the publishing rights to their artists'
music. 56 When the record company pays mechanical royalties to its
publishing subsidiary, the subsidiary keeps its publisher's share and
distributes the remainder to the composer.5 7 Self-publishing would, of
course, earn the artist-songwriter up to twice as much, depending on
the nature of the publisher-songwriter royalty split.5 8
Even the sophisticated composer must contend with the fact that
55. Although there is no bar to a recording contract providing that recording and re-
lated costs are recoupable out of mechanical royalties for compositions which are published
by the artist (called controlled compositions), this practice is not common. See THIS Busi-
NESS OF Music, supra note 8, at 544-46 (sample recording contract); see note 8 supra.
56. Many record companies will request an assignment of an artist's publishing rights
when they sign the artist to a recording contract. This assignment involves entering into a
publishing contract with the artist-songwriter. THIS BUSINESS OF Music, supra note 8, at 8.
Such contracts typically provide that the publisher issues licenses, collects mechanical royal-
ties, and pays one half or more of the royalties to the songwriter. Id. at 154
57. An alternate method used by record companies to reduce mechanical royalty pay-
ments is to provide in recording contracts that a lower mechanical royalty, perhaps 75% of
the statutory rate, will be paid for controlled compositions. THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC, supra
note 8, at 14. Compare the recommended contract for a new recording artist (all of artist's
publishing rights assigned to record company) with that for an established recording artist
(no restriction of artist's publishing rights). ENTERTAINMENT LAW INSTITUTE FORMS, supra
note 34, at 1, 7-8, 13-27.
58. Although the preceding discussion portrays a rather bleak economic picture for the
songwriter-recording artist, most of these people actually do earn money even if they do not
sell enough records to recoup recording costs from their artists' royalties. Artists are often
paid rather generous cash advances by their record companies (recoupable from artists' roy-
alties), wages for their time while recording in the studio, and fees for personal perform-
ances. An artist who feels exploited and underpaid will, of course, be of little value to a
record company. Record companies can justify their practices, to a certain degree, in that
they undertake a great financial risk every time they sign an unknown artist and commit
their financial resources toward that artist's future. See THIS BUSINESS OF Music, supra
note 8, at 1-15; Bergman, supra note 48, at 7.
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inflation has greatly eroded the value of the two cent royalty. Although
record sales have increased dramatically, giving songwriters a propor-
tionate increase in royalty income, record company revenues have in-
creased at a much more rapid rate.59 This growing economic disparity
could not be eliminated by songwriters and music publishers alone.
Legislative action was required. Many copyright law revisions were
attempted between 1924 and 1940.60 Not until 1955, however, did seri-
ous discussion of copyright revision begin.6' The movement led to
many studies and reports and to the introduction of a revision bill in
1964.62 The 1964 bill formed the basis of the Copyright Act of 1976.
Compulsory Licensing Under the 1976 Act
As was the case with the 1909 Act, mechanical licensing was a con-
troversial subject of the recent copyright revision. The Register of
Copyrights initiated the struggle when, after publishing two highly
praised, scholarly studies of compulsory licensing,63 he recommended
to Congress in 1961 that compulsory licensing be eliminated entirely,
and that composers be granted exclusive control over mechanical rights
in their works." The recommendation met with the approval of schol-
ars and members of the copyright bar,65 authors, and composers. 66 The
favorable reactions were, however, drowned in a sea of protests from
the recording industry.67 Elimination of the compulsory license would
have greatly reduced the leverage which record companies have when
"negotiating" mechanical licenses. Without the two cent compulsory
license available, a record company would have to pay whatever licens-
ing rate was demanded.
The Register of Copyrights retreated from his position, in 196568
and by 1976, elimination of compulsory licensing was a dead issue.
59. 1975 SENATE REPORT, supra note 39, at 92.
60. See HENN, supra note 25, at 21-35.
61. 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 40, at 47.
62. Id at 47-50. The original 1964 revision bill was simultaneously introduced as H.R.
11947, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), and S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). Id
63. W. BLAISDELL, THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE COMPULSORY LICENSE, Copy-
RIGrr OFFICE STUDY No. 6 (1958), reprinted in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 937 (Arthur
Fisher memorial ed. 1963); HENN, supra note 25.
64. 1961 REP. REG., supra note 26, at 36.
65. See, etg., HOUSE Comm. ON THE JUDIcIARY, 88TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT
LAW REVISION PART 2, DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON THE REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 291 (statement of
Herman Finkelstein), 303 (statement of Harry G. Henn), 371 (statement of Melville B. Nim-
mer), 395 (statement of Samuel Tannenbaum) (Comm. Print 1963).
66. Eg. id at 241 (statement of American Guild of Authors and Composers).
67. Eg., REP. REG. PART 4, supra note 28, at 413-48 (statement of Record Indus. Ass'n
of Am., Inc.).,
68. Supp. REP. REG., supra note 24, at 53-59.
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The remaining controversy centered on setting a proper royalty rate.69
Section 106 of the Copyright Act of 1976 grants five exclusive
rights to the copyright proprietor of a musical composition: (1) "to
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;" 70 (2) "to
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;" (3) "to
distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the pub-
lic;" (4) "to perform the copyrighted work publicly;" and (5) "to dis-
play the copyrighted work publicly."'7 1
Section 115 of the Copyright Act of 1976, like section l(e) of the
1909 Act, greatly limits the exclusive rights granted by section 106 by
providing for compulsory licensing of music for phonorecords. Copy-
right proprietors of literary works, dramatic works, pantomimes, cho-
reographic works, pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, or motion
pictures and other audiovisual works are not subject to similar restric-
tions.72 Section 115 of the 1976 Act did, however, modify prior law in
several important respects and clarify several issues which arose under
the 1909 Act.
Availability and Scope of the Compulsory License
The 1976 amendments did not significantly change the existing
policy concerning the availability and scope of compulsory licenses.
The amendments reflect either earlier court interpretations of provi-
sions which were ambiguous under the 1909 Act or changes that were
felt necessary to clarify the scope of the compulsory license.73
A compulsory license may now be obtained for recording nondra-
69. 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 40, at 107.
70. Unlike the 1909 Act, the 1976 Act makes a clear distinction between "copies" and
"phonorecords." The 1976 Act defines "copies" as "material objects, other than pho-
norecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from
which the work can be perceived, repreduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. app. § 101 (1976). The 1976 Act defines
"phonorecords" as "material objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a mo-
tion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or later devel-
oped, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." Id. (emphasis added).
A clear distinction must also be made between the copyright in a sound recording and
the separate copyright in the underlying musical composition from which the recording is
made. Both musical compositions and sound recordings are copyrightable under 17 U.S.C.
app. § 102 (1976). An interest in the copyright in a sound recording does not, however, give
one any rights in the musical composition which is embodied in the sound recording. See
Meyers, Sound Recordings and the New Copyright Act, 22 N.Y.L.S. L. REv. 573 (1977).
71. 17 U.S.C. app. § 106 (1976).
72. 17 U.S.C. app. §§ 107-118 (1976). Broadcasts, however, are subject to compulsory
licensing. 17 U.S.C. app. § 111 (1976); see Cramer, Some Observations on the Copyright Law
of 1976 Not Everything is Beautiful, 1 COMM/ENT 157 (1977); Meyer, The Feat ofHoudini or
How the New Act Disentangles the CATV-Copyright Knot, 22 N.Y.L.S. L. REv. 545 (1977).
73. 1976 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 40, at 107-09.
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matic musical works74 when phonorecords of the works have been pre-
viously made and distributed to the public with the permission of the
copyright owner.75 The distribution requirement remedied a signifi-
cant problem that had arisen under the 1909 Act. A compulsory license
was apparently available whenever an authorized recording was made,
even if it was never distributed to the public. 76 In addition, the 1976
Act makes it clear that compulsory licensing is not available to record
pirates, those who without authorization duplicate and sell legitimate
sound recordings protected by federal copyright law or by state law.77
Recent case law which developed under the 1909 Act also denied com-
pulsory licenses to record pirates. 78
The 1976 Act also denies compulsory licenses to manufacturers of
phonorecords intended primarily for background music systems, juke-
boxes, broadcasting, television synchronization or motion picture
soundtracks.79
A recording made under a compulsory license may not alter the
fundamental musical character of the composition. A licensee may ar-
range the composition only to the extent necessary to make it conform
to the style of the performance involved.80
Compulsory Licensing Procedure
The 1976 Act substantially changed compulsory licensing proce-
dure in an unsuccessful attempt to conform to industry licensing prac-
tices. The 1976 Act deleted the 1909 Act requirement that the
copyright proprietor file a notice of use after licensing a recording for
74. The use of the term "nondramatic musical works" excludes motion picture sound-
tracks and show tunes from coverage under the compulsory licensing scheme.
75. 17 U.S.C. app. § 115(a)(1) (1976). Thus, a compulsory license cannot be obtained
for a song which has never been recorded and released to the public.
76. 1909 Act § 1(e). No reported cases ever addressed this issue. 2 NmMER ON Copy-
RIGHT, supra note 12, § 8.04[C].
77. Sound recordings, as defined in 17 U.S.C. app. § 101 (1976), have only been subject
to copyright protection since February 15, 1972. Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 2, 85 Stat. 391, 392
(1971). Sound recordings made prior to that date are not copyrightable, but are protected by
various state statutes. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 653h (West Supp. 1978) (fel-
ony/misdemeanor for unauthorized copying of sound recordings made prior to February 15,
1972); N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 275.00-.15, 420.00-.05 (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979) (felony/
misdemeanor)). See Meyers, Sound Recordings and the New Copyright Act, 22 N.Y.L.S. L.
Rnv. 573 (1977); Towe, Record Piracy, 22 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 243 (1977).
78. The landmark case in this area is Duchess Music Corp. v. Stem, 458 F.2d 1305 (9th
Cir.), cert denied sub nom. Rosner v. Duchess Music Corp., 409 U.S. 847 (1972). The
Duchess case is criticized at 2 NMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 12, § 8.04[E][1].
79. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (1976); 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 40, at 108; see Com-
ment, The Applicability of the Compulsory License Provision to Radio and Television
Advertisements, 18 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 1126 (1971).
80. 17 U.S.C. app. § 115(a)(2) (1976).
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the first time.81 The notice of use provision served no useful purpose
and often precluded the inattentive copyright proprietor from taking
action against manufacturers of unauthorized recordings until a notice
of use was filed.82
A licensee must still, however, serve a "notice of intention to ob-
tain a compulsory license" upon the copyright proprietor.83 This notice
functions like the "notice of intention to use" which was required by
section 101(e) of the 1909 Act. The 1909 Act, however, required service
upon both the copyright proprietor and the Copyright Office.84 Notice
under the 1976 Act need only be served upon the copyright proprietor.
Filing in the Copyright Office is necessary only if the Copyright Office
records do not reveal the address of the copyright proprietor.8 5 Notice
must be given prior to the actual distribution of the phonorecords, but
may be made as late as thirty days after the recording is made.86 The
additional time factor simply recognizes the industry practice of ob-
taining the license after the recording is made.87
Royalties
The 1976 Act made two major changes regarding the payment of
royalties. First, royalties are payable only for phonorecords made and
actually distributed,88 rather than for all phonorecords manufactured,
as provided by the 1909 Act.89 Second, the royalty rate was increased.
A copyright proprietor is now entitled to two and three-fourths cents
per song or one-half cent per minute of playing time, whichever is
greater.90
The new "made and distributed" 91 requirement will make opera-
81. See note 29 & accompanying text supra.
82. Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Garzilli,
Rosette v. Rainbo: Its Impact on the Copyright Law and the Music Industry, 20 BULL. COPY-
RIGHT Soc'Y 412 (1973); 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 12, § 8.04[G][2][b].
83. 17 U.S.C. app. § 115(b)(1) (1976).
84. 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 12, § 8.04[G][1][b]; see note 30 & accompa-
nying text supra.
85. 17 U.S.C. app. § 115(b)(1) (1976); interim regulations of the Copyright Office con-
cerning notice procedures are at 43 Fed. Reg. 44,517-18 (1978) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. §
201.18).
86. A compulsory license may not be obtained later than 30 days after a recording is
made. Id
87. See note 41 & accompanying text supra. If a record company does not obtain a
license in 30 days, however, the compulsory license becomes unavailable and a publisher
could demand a high royalty rate.
88. 17 U.S.C. app. § 115(c)(1) (1976).
89. 1909 Act § 1(e).
90. 17 U.S.C. app. § 115(c)(2) (1976).
91. For royalty purposes, "a phonorecord is considered 'distributed' if the person exer-
cising the compulsory license has voluntarily and permanently parted with its possession."
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tion under a compulsory license much less objectionable to record com-
panies. For example, if a record company makes 100,000 records
under a compulsory license and is only able to distribute 1,000 of those
records, under the 1976 Act, it will only have to pay mechanical royal-
ties for the 1,000 records actually distributed. If there are twelve copy-
righted songs on each record, mechanical royalties will only be about
$330. If on the other hand, this record company had made the 100,000
records subject to a compulsory license under the 1909 Act, it would
have had to pay two cents per song for every record made.92 Even if no
records were ever distributed, the company would have had to pay
about $24,000 in mechanical royalties, further increasing losses on a
losing record. Although the made and distributed requirement of the
1976 Act may not actually encourage use- of the compulsory license, it
is less objectionable to record companies and therefore a much less ef-
fective bargaining tool for publishers.
The 1976 increase in the royalty rate was the first since compul-
sory licensing was created in 1909. The recording industry waged an
incessant battle of statistics against any increase.93 Most of these argu-
ments were deflated, however, by the fact that the retail list price of the
average popular record album has increased from $3.98 in 196494 to
$7.98 and $8.98 in 1978.95 From 1964 to 1974, record company reve-
nues increased at more than twice the rate of mechanical royalty
This is consistent with industry practices of maintaining royalty reserves to offset returns of
unsold records by retailers and wholesalers. 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 40, at 110.
Under new Copyright Office regulations, however, a record is deemed to be permanently
distributed one year from the time that the licensee first parts with possession of the record
or at any time when generally accepted accounting principles or the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice would recognize a sale, whichever comes first. 43 Fed. Reg. 44,519 (1978) (interim regu-
lations) (to be codified in 37 C.F.R. § 201.19(a)(4)). For records which are given away by
the licensee or otherwise distributed in some manner other than by sale, the licensee is
deemed to have "permanently parted with possession" at the time the distribution is made.
Id; Sippel, Berman Ducks No C'right Questions in L., BILLBOARD, March 25, 1978, at 24.
Involuntary conversions of records such as fire or theft, and the destruction of unwanted
phonorecords do not constitute distribution. 1976 HousE REPORT, supra note 40, at 110.
92. See notes 31 & 39 supra.
93. Eg., 1965 House Hearings, supra note 21, at 771-888 (statement of John Desmond
Glover) (consolidated income statement of the recording industry purporting to demonstrate
that a one cent increase in the compulsory license rate would drive most small record com-
panies out of business, id at 810-13); 1975 SENATE REPORT, supra note 39, at 91-93.
94. HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89M CONG., 1ST SESS., CoPYRIGHT LAW REvi-
SION PART 5, 1964 REVISION BILL WrrH DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS 133 (Comm. Print
1965) (statement of Clive Davis).
95. Goldberg, Record Prices Rising?, ROLLING STONE, September 21, 1978, at 18. A
typical popular record album contains twelve songs. Supp. REP. REG., supra note 24, at 57.
If all 12 songs were licensed at the current statutory rate of 2 3/4€ per song, the licensing cost
to the record company would be approximately 334; per album.
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revenues. 96
It is noteworthy that many licenses negotiated prior to 1978 will
follow the new statutory pattern and pay the new rate, as many negoti-
ated licenses currently in use state only that "the royalty shall be the
statutory rate in effect at the time the phonorecords are made." 97
Licenses may still, of course, be negotiated.
The rates set by section 115 are subject to review and modification
by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal98 in 1980,99 again in 1987, and
every ten years thereafter.Ico The Copyright Royalty Tribunal is an
independent agency of the legislative branch' 0' composed of five com-
missioners appointed by the President for seven year terms. 0 2 In de-
termining whether or not to adjust the statutory rate, the Tribunal must
consider four objectives defined in the Act.' 03
The modified accounting procedures for payment of royalties
under a compulsory license are more stringent than those under the
1909 Act.I104 Royalty payments must be made "on or before the twenti-
eth day of each month and shall include all royalties for the month next
preceding. Each monthly payment shall be made under oath. .. ."105
"[D]etailed cumulative annual statements of account, certified by a
certified public accountant"'' 1 6 are required for every compulsory li-
cense. Monthly statements verified under oath were also required by
96. 1975 SENATE REPORT, supra note 39, at 91-92; see note 59 & accompanying text
supra.
97. THIS BUSINESS OF Music, supra note 8, at 535 (sample license form); Sippel,
Bermran Ducks No C'rIght Questions in LA., BILLBOARD, March 25, 1978, at 24.
98. The Copyright Royalty Tribunal is established and guided by 17 U.S.C. app. §
801-810 (1976).
99. 17 U.S.C. app. § 804(a)(1) (1976).
100. 17 U.S.C. app. § 804(a)(2)(B) (1976).
101. 17 U.S.C. app. § 801(a) (1976).
102. 17 U.S.C. app. § 802(a) (1976).
103. 17 U.S.C. app. § 801(b)(1) (1976) states that when calculating royalty rates, the
Copyright Royalty Tribunal shall consider the following objectives: "(A) To maximize the
availability of creative works to the public; (B) To afford the copyright owner a fair return
for his creative work and the copyright user a fair income under existing economic condi-
tions; (C) To reflect the relative roles of the copyright owner and the copyright user in the
product made available to the public with respect to relative creative contribution, techno-
logical contribution, capital investment, cost, risk, and contribution to the opening of new
markets for creative expression and media for their communication; (D) To minimize any
disruptive impact on the structure of the industries involved and on generally prevailing
industry practices."
The Copyright Royalty Tribunal is unique to world copyright law. There is little legis-
lative history on the Tribunal and its exact functions are as yet unclear. See Brylawski, The
Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1265 (1977).
104. 1909 Act § 101(e).
105. 17 U.S.C. app. § 115(c)(3) (1976).
106. Id
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section l(e) of the 1909 Act, but no annual statement was necessary.
The Register of Copyrights is required to prescribe regulations gov-
erning both the monthly and annual statements, setting forth the
"form, content, and manner of certification" of such statements.10 7
The record companies claim that the monthly statements required
by both the 1976 and 1909 Acts are burdensome and unnecessary, 10 8 so
negotiated licenses will probably follow the same quarterly accounting
as before.'0 9 Nevertheless, the more stringent reporting requirements
found in the Act and the regulations are expected to lead to higher
accounting standards for negotiated licenses, especially for free or pro-
motional records. 10
Remedies for Breach and Infringement
The 1976 Act has dramatically improved the remedies available in
the event of a breach or infringement of mechanical rights. Under both
prior"' and present' 1 2 law, one who violates exclusive recording
rights 1 3 is a copyright infringer and is liable for all infringement penal-
ties." 4 Exclusive recording rights exist, however, only when a copy-
righted composition has never before been published as a
phonorecord."15
In addition to breach of exclusive rights, there are two other types
of infringements upon mechanical rights. The first is failure to pay the
royalties as they fall due under a license. The second is making and
distributing phonorecords without a license when a license is available.
Under the 1909 Act, the nonpayment of royalties under a license
did not constitute infringement. However, the copyright proprietor had
a cause of action for all royalties due plus, in the court's discretion, an
additional amount of up to three times the royalties due as well as costs
107. Id; interim regulations are at 43 Fed. Reg. 44,519-21 (1978) (to be codified in 37
C.F.R. § 201.19).
108. Supp. REP. REG., supra note 24, at 58. The 1965 version of the revision bill pro-
vided for quarterly royalty payments. Id at 208.
109. See note 36 & accompanying text supra.
110. Another outgrowth of these regulations may be an increase in investigative audits
by publishers or record companies' royalty statements. Sippel, Berman Ducks No C'l'ght
Questions in L-4., BILLBOARD, March 25, 1978, at 24.
111. Davilla v. Brunswick-Balke Collender Co., 94 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1938); 2 NnER
ON CopypticHT, supra note 12, § 8.04[C].
112. 17 U.S.C. app. § 501 (1976).
113. 17 U.S.C. app. §§ 106, 115 (1976).
114. 1975 SENATE REPORT, supra note 39, at 90.
115. Under the 1909 Act, it was held that where recordings of copyrighted songs had
been released in England, the copyright proprietor had not lost its exclusive recording rights
in the United States. An attempt by a American record company to invoke a compulsory
license based upon this foreign use of the songs constituted infringement. Beechwood Music
Corp. v. Vee Jay Records, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 8 (S.D.N.Y.), affid, 328 F.2d 728 (2d Cir. 1964).
January 1979]
and attorneys' fees. 116 Such sums were not often significant enough to
warrant court action, and the remedy did little to prevent financially
irresponsible parties from invoking the compulsory license without
ever paying royalties. 17 These remedies were, however, expanded by
the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971 which made the unautho-
rized manufacture of copyrighted phonorecords an act of
infringement. 118
Section 115(c)(4) of the 1976 Act addresses this problem by treat-
ing nonpayment of royalties under a compulsory license as a copyright
infringement rather than a mere breach of contract. If the licensee does
not pay the royalties due within thirty days after receiving notice of
default from the copyright owner, the license is terminated and the for-
mer licensee becomes an infringer.' 19 In the event of infringement, the
1976 Act provides ample remedies to the copyright proprietor, such as
injunction, 120 impoundment and disposal of the infringing pho-
norecords and the equipment used to make them,121 liability for dam-
ages, including liquidated damages of up to $50,000 or all profits of the
infringer attributed to the infringement, 122 awards of costs and attor-
neys' fees, 123 and, in cases of willful infringement, criminal liability. 24
The 1909 Act was unclear as to the liability created by recording
music for which a compulsory license was available but never obtained
because of a failure to file a notice of use under section 101(e). There
was a question as to whether such use would create liability for in-
fringement or merely for royalties due. Most authorities concluded
that such a use was an infringement, subject to all of the remedies pro-
vided by section 101 of the 1909 Act rather than a contractual breach of
the compulsory license under section 1(e).' 25
The 1976 Act makes it clear that failure to serve the statutory no-
tice of intent to obtain a compulsory license forecloses the possibility of
obtaining a compulsory license. Unless a license is negotiated, making
and distributing phonorecords constitutes infringement subject to the
116. Norbay Music, Inc. v. King Records, Inc., 290 F.2d 617, 620 (2d Cir. 1961); 1909
Act § 1(e); 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 12, § 8.04[G][3].
117. HENN, supra note 25, at 35.
118. Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971) (repealed 1976); see Sloane, The New Copy-
right in Sound Recordings, J. BEVERLY HILLS B.A., September 1972, at 29.
119. 17 U.S.C. app. § 501 (1976).
120. 17 U.S.C. app. § 502 (1976).
121. 17 U.S.C. app. §§ 503, 509 (1976).
122. 17 U.S.C. app. § 504 (1976).
123. 17 U.S.C. app. § 505 (1976).
124. 17 U.S.C. app. § 506 (1976).
125. See, e.g., Duchess Music Corp. v. Stem, 331 F. Supp. 127 (D. Ariz. 1971), rev'don
other grounds, 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nonz. Rosner v. Duchess Music
Corp., 409 U.S. 847 (1972); 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 12, § 8.04[G][l][b].
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wide range of penalties.12 6 The 1976 Act also makes any attempted use
of compulsory licensing by record pirates an act of infringement. 127
Conclusion: The Potential Impact of the Copyright Act on
Mechanical Licensing
Congress set out to achieve three major goals in revising the com-
pulsory licensing laws. Only one of these goals was actually attained.
First, Congress did not amend compulsory licensing procedure to con-
form completely to trade practices.1 28 Second, Congress failed to sub-
stantially raise royalty rates as was needed.129 Congress did, however,
create strong remedies against violators of compulsory licensing
requirements.1 30
When amending the procedural provisions of compulsory licens-
ing, Congress had two directions in which to go. First, the compulsory
license could have been modeled upon the negotiated licenses in use at
the time. To conform to trade practices Congress would have had to
require quarterly accounting of royalties with no distribution, oath, or
other complicating factors which were disfavored by the recording in-
dustry.131 Second, Congress could have kept the compulsory license in
its existing unworkable form, thereby assuring a continuance of the
practice of using negotiated licenses only. Congress, seemingly ignor-
ing the fact that the 1909 Act compulsory licenses were rarely used,
took neither of those two paths. Instead, it created a new form of the
compulsory license which will still probably never be used because of
its many procedural complexities.
The new compulsory license is procedurally much less objectiona-
ble to the recording industry. Royalties must now be paid only for
records made and actually distributed rather than for all records
made.132 The distribution requirement conforms with current trade
practices but the remainder of the new licensing procedures do not.133
With this major roadblock removed, however, operating under a com-
pulsory license may be much less objectionable to a record company.
126. 17 U.S.C. app. § 115(b)(2) (1976); see notes 120-24 & accompanying text supra.
127. 17 U.S.C. app. § 115(a)(1) (1976); see notes 77-78 & accompanying text supra; Mey-
ers, Sound Recordings and the New Copyight Act, 22 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 573 (1977).
128. See Supp. RaP. REG., supra note 24, at 53; see notes 74-87 & accompanying text
supra.
129. See Stpp. REP. REG., supra note 24, at 53; see notes 88-110 & accompanying text
supra.
130. See Supp. RaP. REG., supra note 24, at 53; see notes 111-127 & accompanying text
supra.
131. See notes 29-38 & accompanying text supra.
132. See notes 91-92 & accompanying text supra.
133. See notes 29-38 & accompanying text supra.
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Removal of the objectionable features of compulsory licensing
makes the statutory rate an even more firm ceiling on negotiated li-
cense rates than it has been in the past. 134 Because of the industry prac-
tice of recording first and getting a license later,135 it has always been
possible for a publisher to demand a higher mechanical royalty rate in
lieu of forcing a record company to rely upon the compulsory license
provisions. While this approach never seems to have had much of a
coercive effect, 136 it will be even less coercive under the 1976 Act.137
This argument may be countered by the fact that the basic royalty
rate was increased from two cents per song to two and three-fourths
cents per song, but considering that this was the first raise in almost
seventy inflationary years, the increase is illusory, both in relative and
absolute terms.
An alternative approach could have been taken by Congress to
alleviate the problem of artificially low mechanical licensing rates
which would still have functioned to keep music readily available to
the public at a reasonable price. Congress could have raised the statu-
tory rate above what they thought to be a fair rate. The effect of this
increase would be to allow negotiated license rates to float to a realistic
market price, presumably below the statutory rate.138 Publishers de-
manding overly high rates would price themselves out of the market or
be limited by a record company's "offer" to invoke a compulsory li-
cense. Along with this rate increase, the compulsory license could be
made procedurally more attractive to record companies in order to
make it a viable alternative to a negotiated license with an inordinately
high royalty rate. Negotiated royalty rates would probably rest at a
level in between the present statutory rate and a new higher statutory
rate that would be compatible with both the recording industry and
with songwriters and publishers. A rate increase could also be accom-
plished by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal in 1980. The Tribunal,
however, is restrained from making dramatic rate increases that could
have a disruptive effect on prevailing industry practices. 39 Either of
134. See notes 39-41 & accompanying text supra.
135. Id
136. Id
137. The recording industry rejects the image of the monolithic record company dealing
with the powerless and innocent songwriter because of the fact that musicpublishers rather
than composers issue mechanical licenses. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 21, at 680 (state-
ment of Record Industry Ass'n of Am., Inc.). Many songwriters, however, particularly those
who record their own music, publish their own music also. THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC, supra
note 8, at 233-35; see notes 57 & 58 & accompanying text supra.
138. This assumes that the present rate of 2 3/4€ per song is lower than what a free-
market rate would be. The author does not, however, purport to know what this free-market
royalty rate would be or exactly how it could be determined.
139. See note 103 & accompanying text supra.
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these alternatives, however, is preferable to the existing system which
so greatly restricts the control that songwriters have over their music.

